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G.D.P.R. was launched in 2012 by Viviane Reding MEP, then Vice-President of the European Commission. She told me from Brussels that she was worried about “big business” like the American Gafa – the French style for Google, Amazon, Facebook and Apple. “They just ignored the old law,” Reding said. “Cambridge Analytica’s Facebook scandal, if it happened on May 26 this year, would have cost Facebook billions of dollars, among other things, and they could not pass on citizens’ personal information without asking citizens to ask, and you can Do not steal and simply tell them that under the new law it is not possible, and that if you do, the punishment will be very, very severe. ”
For Reding and for his colleague and G.D.P.R. Moderator Jan Philipp Albrecht, the law mainly affects companies that process personal data. “In the last ten years, there has been no chance of catching up with the big Silicon Valley Internet companies,” said Albrecht. “With G.D.P.R. this will change.” He hopefully added, “Consumer power has not really started.”
The Data Protection Officer in Ireland, Helen Dixon, is one of the people at the heart of the G.D.P.R mission, where many multinationals have their European headquarters. In anticipation of the law, his office hired a hundred people on a short detour, with forty other people on the way. “We have many lawyers, communications specialists, investigators – some on grounds of criminal law, others on prudential grounds – and we have business analysts, systems analysts,” he said. she said. The Vision, the Dixon of the Irish D.P.C. She is far from the team of 30 people she inherited in 2014. The main question, she told me, “is how many simultaneous exams we can perform.”
Albrecht’s and Dixon’s enthusiasm contrasts with the omnipresent cynicism that many privacy professionals seem to be spreading in their profession. Even Halpert and Ustaran, who are more positive than most, have struggled to say how G.D.P.R. Compliance will improve the life of an average citizen. The law promises advances in global information hygiene: It becomes difficult for large data processing companies not to know what the data is, where it is stored, and how it is stored. But at the individual level, the benefits are less obvious. In general, companies have simply designed longer privacy policies – an exaggeration that refutes the intent of the legislature. When the law comes into force, independent experts and activists hope for more meaningful interventions. Mireille Hildebrandt, a professor at the Free University of Brussels, said that G.D.P.R. could be especially useful for eliminating algorithmic distortions and other cases of machines doing something wrong. “Automated decisions that have a significant impact can be challenged and need to be meaningfully explained,” she told me.
Data protection is sold to Europeans as a tool for balance, equality and autonomy in the digital world. But it is also a very individual diet; It is unlikely that a person’s actions will change. It is therefore relatively easy for us as a collective to make concessions of comfort, ignorance or resignation. Article 80 of the G.D.P.R. is a feature that seeks to remedy this situation by introducing, for the first time in European law, the possibility of collective redress. There is no automatic right to sue for damages, but G.D.P.R. allows temporary orders to stop the processing of data. The provision is carefully protected because, as Reding points out, “what we do not want in Europe is a class action lawsuit of the American kind that only creates the activities of lawyers”. Paragraph 80 allows civil rights attorneys or consumer advocates to defend themselves in the name of the community or the public interest.
According to Albrecht, these NGOs and other institutions will not only be looking for the “only one” who has time to manage their own data, but also those who have no time or risk. one hundred percent in these technologies, laws and regulations. “But even with these various actors, there is a cautious note about the aspirations of the law.” No data protection law protects us from ourselves, “said Albrecht.
One year ago, I volunteered to board a primary school in New Orleans where I live. Two months ago, I tried to comfort her in a cafeteria full of troubled parents, explaining why the school announced the inauguration of this autumn three days before the end of the school year. I apologized. I described the confusion that exists in trying to solve a budget deficit of six hundred thousand dollars. I apologized again. But what I did not explain was that the fate of the Cypress Academy, a unique closure in a single, charter-dominated school district, was not just a school. It was the failure of startups and what happens when a school system is redesigned around the drivers of the free market: autonomy, competition and customer choice. Honestly, I understood that later. Which is good because the parents did not want to hear the market theory. They just wanted their kids to get a good public education.
In New Orleans, just in the neighborhoods of big cities, almost all schools are now charter schools. This is the result of the most ambitious school reform in the country’s history. In 2004, the year before Katrina, only forty-four percent of New Orleans high school students had graduated. After Katrina, the state of Louisiana took over almost all schools in the city and began to assign them to independent groups – single-church charters such as Cypress or primarily local charter organizations or C.M.O.s. This month, after thirteen years, the Orleans Town Council took over the supervision of all public schools in the city, the reunification of the district and an intense reflection – locally and nationally – on the impact of handing the city over to a charter system.
This system, in which eighty-three percent of students are economically disadvantaged, still has a long way to go. Forty percent of the city’s schools are rated “D” or “F” by state standards, and New Orleans is not new to the national separation of school vacations: CMOs are primarily poor black students, while independent “community” deeds serve racially mixed populations. But since Katrina, enrollment, college attendance, and college endurance have risen from ten to sixty-seven percent. This is confirmed by a recent study by Matthew Larsen, a professor at Lafayette College, and Doug Harris, an educational researcher and economist based in Tulane, who has in the past distanced himself from the results and the idea of ”test to test”. same learning. “New Orleans has done everything without two of the most disgusting charm critics: there are no for-profit charter schools in the city, and the charter system deprives the” normal “school of any monetary system In New Orleans, there is no other system.
I was part of a charter school and I was able to see this system first-hand. I joined the Cypress board because Bob Berk, the founder of the school and a childhood friend, convinced me that primary school volunteer service is the easiest way to help children in difficult situations. (Save the Children recently declared Louisiana the worst state for children for the second consecutive year.) And I admired the school’s philosophy, its diversity, its “all-child” education, and its commitment to teaching all kinds of learners, gifted with special needs, in a classroom.
In New Orleans, parents classify schools for a common application. Cypress has therefore treated every challenge (teacher turnover, disappointing education) as an existential threat that requires a creative response. At the end of the third year, parents’ demand for the next few years was strong. But this success came with a wood rot: the school could not afford to offer education that aroused the parents’ interest. For four months, the Board has pursued initiatives that are familiar to every lavish business: possible mergers, cost reductions, income reforms (in this case, tuition), and raising capital. Looking back, there was too much hope and too little difficult decisions. No solution has come.
Startups fail all the time. That’s why markets work. (Doug Harris attributes much of the success of the New Orleans Charter system to the bad schools.) But Cypress’s failure is unique in the history of school reform in New Orleans; after Michael Stone, the former Co-C.E.O. It was the first time New Orleans New Schools had completed a “good” school. The fate of Cypress is bound up with one big mistake: a school system that is equipped with market economy engines but does not have all the features. Cypress had to succeed as a company through competition and choice. But like other startups, the market system was only built in three key areas.
First, there is the incomplete reward system. An open secret in the charter community is that many charters work because they devour the time, energy and body of their employees. This also applies to private startups. but a young founder knows that her investment of thirty-four could lead to a life in microdosing and suborbital spaceflight. A charter school will never provide such comfort. The economic model is based on an endless life and frequent exhaustion.
The second problem, the most catastrophic for Cypress, is the shock of a competitive system with a fixed-price economy. Cypress wanted to educate all children and 26% of the students had special needs, twice as many as in the city. Financing New Orleans for these students, although much improved, is still ongoing. Any student who had difficulty took money off other students from the budget. In this context, other schools have “recommended” families with special cypress needs. Cypress welcomed these children; It was his mission. Cypress is a free entry-level school, unlike a chain of starters who can customize their menus or prices to attract specific customers and improve margins. He could not choose his clients morally or legally, nor the income he could draw from anyone.